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1 Introduction
There exist situations where products are not traceable by consumers and con-
sumers are not able to identify either the producer or the level of quality of prod-
ucts or services. When doing their choices, consumers mainly base their decisions
on the reputation of the entire industry. In this sense, rms share, at least par-
tially, the reputation of the industry. An empirical evidence for this phenomena
is food safety. Food safety is a credence attribute of product: consumers are not
able, because it is too costly, to check the real quality of the product even after
consumption. Even if products may have di¤erent safety levels, consumers con-
sider products as generic (e.g fresh produce). Indeed, after an outbreak of food
poisoning, everyone in the industry will su¤er from the safety outbreak. Since
mid-may, the E-coli cumcumber outbreakhas killed 16 people and infects more
that 1100 people in Europe. The Spanish Federation of Producers / exporters
(FEPEX) estimates lost sales up to e200 million per week. The cucumber crisis
has also a¤ected French producers, who, according to the tomatoes and cucumbers
producers association su¤er from a fall of sales of French cucumbers by 75%.1
In this article, we address the issue of entry in an industry where rms pro-
duce di¤erent quality levels but cannot di¤erentiate themselves from their rivals.
Also, producing low-quality generates a negative externality on the whole indus-
try. We build a simple model and we show that the link between market structure
and welfare is ambiguous. In the Laissez Faire situation, an increase in the
number of rms has two opposite e¤ects. First, it leads the price to decrease
increasing welfare. Second, incentives to free ride increase, reducing the average
level of quality and then reducing welfare. Free entry is thus not socially optimal.
Contrarily to conventional wisdom, we argue that the imposition of a Minimum
Quality Standard may induce rms to enter the market and increase welfare.
We have in mind the safety issue of fresh fruit and vegetables in Europe which
is one-dimensional, as opposed to the United States where regulation on the safety
of those produce also refers to the presence of microbiological hazards such as E-
coli, Salmonella, etc. The denition of food safety for fresh fruit and vegetables
in Europe relies on the Maximum Residue Limits for pesticides (MRLs) set by
the European authorities (Regulation (EC) No 396/2005). Residues found in or
on produce are judged, according to these laws, as being above, at or below the
limit. Any food operator must comply with a performance standard, as dened
in Henson and Caswell (1999): the food product they market should reach the
prescribed product quality standards and/or safety levels. How they do reach the
standard is left to the discretion of the food operators. Public agencies in charge
of enforcing law and monitoring food safety, mostly conduct regular on-site and
1Nouvel observateur: Economy Real Time
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product-oriented inspections. In the case of fresh produce, samples are collected
and laboratory analyses are carried out to check that residue levels are within the
legal limits (see for instance Rouvière et al. 2010). If excess levels are found, food
operators are found guilty of an o¤ence and the whole box of the incriminated
product is taken o¤ the market. The cost of conducting a laboratory analysis
(e300 in average) prevents from analyses conducted by consumers.
The closest literature on this issue is the literature about collective reputa-
tion. Tirole (1996) considers that collective reputation should be assumed to be
the aggregate reputation of individual agents. In a context of imperfect informa-
tion available to consumers about quality, he shows that the composition of the
producer group matters. Winfree and McCluskey (2005) assume that collective
reputation is a common property resource and show that the (exogenous) number
of rms should be considered closely because of free-rider e¤ects. However, in those
studies, the size of the group of producers is taken as xed and then does not allow
for entry in or exit from the group. Our model, although static, endogeneizes the
entry decision.
Moreover, our article directly participates to the controversial debate in the
industrial organisation literature as regards to the e¤ect of a Minimum Quality
Standard (MQS) on competition (for instance, see Leland 1979). Ronnen (1991)
shows that an adequate MQS can increase both quantities sold and quality and
then social welfare. The intuition of this result is that an increase in the low
quality induces an increase of the high quality (in order to soften price competition)
but equilibrium prices are however lower and more consumers buy the product
(see also Crampes and Hollander 1995 for a similar result). The robustness of
this result has been questioned in few direction. Valetti (2000) shows that this
statement is sensitive to the mode of competition and Scarpa (1998) shows that it
depends on the duopolistic market structure. Garella and Petrakis (2008) justify
the use of MQS in industries where consumers face imperfect information. They
point out that a MQS will change the consumersperception on quality. However,
none of these papers consider the possibility of entry and/or exit. As Boccard
and Wauthy (2005) have already underlined, studying quality regulation through
quantity regulation, MQS would induce rm to exit the market and/or reduce the
entry of new rms. Our model of quality di¤ers from previous studies because
there is no di¤erentiation but quality externalities.
The article proceeds as follows. We set up the theoretical model to emphasize
the free entry issue in a Laissez Fairesituation. Next, we analyse the competition
e¤ect when a MQS is imposed on the industry. Finally, we provide our conclusions
and their policy implications.
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2 The Model
We focus on an industry in which identical and risk neutral rms choose their level
of quality in order to avoid quality failures. Products may have di¤erent quality
levels but quality is a credence attribute: consumers are not able to observe these
di¤erent quality levels even after consumption. Then, consumers only rely on the
reputation of the entire industry.
Because we consider a static framework where the reputation of the industry
depends on the produced levels of quality, we dont rely on the past history of the
industry. The model can thus be interpreted as an investigation of the reputational
problem faced by an infant industry.
We consider a two-stage game. In the rst stage, prot maximising rms choose
whether or not to enter the market. If a rm enters the market, it faces a xed
(sunk) cost F > 0. Since we focus on quality, each rm produces one unit of the
product. In the second stage, the rm chooses a quality level si  0 with cost
C (si) where C 0 > 0 and C 00 > 0. We assume that the reputation of the industry is
goodwith a probability R (sa) that only depends on the average level of quality
(for simplicity) which is given by sa with
sa =
P
i2N
si
n
(1)
where N denotes the set of the n rms which enter the market, with R0 > 0 and
R00  0. The industry reputation is badwith probability 1 R (sa). The inverse
demand function is then P (n) (with P 0 < 0) if the reputation of the industry is
good, and the inverse demand function is 0 if the reputation of the industry is
bad2. Therefore, the expected prot of rm i is
i = R (sa)P (n)  C (si)  F; (2)
We make the following assumptions on the prot function which hold all through
the paper.
Assumption 1: The prot of a monopolistic rm is non negative when its quality
level is optimal,
F  R (sM)P (1)  C (sM) ; (3)
2This is simply a normalisation. Indeed, suppose that if the reputation is "bad", the in-
verse demand drops to P (n) with 0   < 1. The expected inverse demand is R (sa)P (n) +
(1 R (sa))P (n). It can be rewritten as (R (sa) + (1 R (sa)))P (n). To see that our as-
sumption is a normalisation, simply relabel (R (sa) + (1 R (sa))) as R (sa).
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where sM denotes the optimal quality e¤ort of the monopolistic rm, i.e.
sM = arg max fR (s)PM   C (s) ; s  0g : (4)
Assumption 2: A monopolistic rms prot is non positive when its quality level
is large enough,
lim
s!+1
(R (s)P (1)  C (s)  F )  0: (5)
In our setting, we can apply the result provided in Spence (1975) (see propo-
sition). The (expected) inverse demand function is R(s)P (n) and we have
@2(R(s)P (n))=@s@n < 0; (6)
thus the monopoly always undersupplies quality (as with consumerspreferences
à la Mussa-Rosen (Mussa and Rosen, 1978)). In other words, the monopoly will
always underinvest in quality because of the distortions that exist between rms
and the society. Our model di¤ers from those seminal works since we focus on
an oligopoly where quality externality among rms induces a second and new
distortion.
3 Laissez fairesituation
In this section, we solve the game described above where there is no intervention
from the regulator. We solve the game through backward induction.
First, we solve the second stage of the game. Assume that n identical rms
entered the market in the rst stage. Firms individually make their quality choice,
si. The optimisation problem for rm i is then
Max
si0
(R (sa)P (n)  C (si)) ; (7)
The rst order condition is
1
n
R0 (sa)P (n) = C 0 (si) : (8)
This condition allows to dene rm i0s best response as an implicit function of the
average quality sa (and of the number of rms n) as usual in private provision
of a public goodgames. Note that @si
@sa
=
1
n
R00(sa)P (n)
C00(si)
 0. Hence, as the average
quality sa increases, rm i has an incentive to decrease its quality level.
In an interior equilibrium, the rms quality levels are identical (due to the
convex nature of the cost function C), i.e. for all i, si = s
 which is characterised
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by:
1
n
R0 (s)P (n) = C 0 (s) : (9)
This equilibrium condition implicitly denes the equilibrium quality level, s, as
a function of the number of rms n.
Proposition 1 An increase in the number of rms lowers the equilibrium quality
level, ds

dn
< 0.
When the number of rms increases rms have incentives to decrease their
quality level. First, quality e¤orts are diluted in the industry reputation then rms
incentives to free ride increase (this results is similar to Winfree and McCluskey
(2005)). Second, the price of the product decreases. Each rms expected benets
decrease then rms provide a lower quality level.
Second, we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. In the rst
stage, rms anticipate the equilibrium quality level (characterised at stage 2) and
decide to enter the market if their ex-ante expected prot is non negative. The
number of rms who enter the market n is then characterised by:
R (s (n))P (n)  C (s (n)) = F; (10)
where n ( 1 according to Assumption 1) denotes the equilibrium number of
rms which is an implicit function of F , the sunk cost of entry. Di¤erentiating
condition (10) with respect to F we obtain:
dn
dF
=

[R0 (s)P (n)  C 0 (s)] ds

dn
+R (s)P 0 (n)
 1
: (11)
From condition (9), we obtain
R0 (s)P (n)  C 0 (s) = (n   1)C 0 (s)  0 (12)
When a rm decides to enter the market, it anticipates that the price (P 0 (n) < 0)
and the equilibrium quality will decrease (ds

dn
< 0). Consequently, the number of
rms increases only if the entry cost decreases:
dn
dF
< 0: (13)
This result strongly depends on the fact that the number of rms has a negative
impact on the equilibrium quality.
Welfare e¤ect of the market structure: In order to appraise the welfare e¤ect,
we consider the equilibrium quality game (stage 2), where each rm provides the
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same (second stage equilibrium) quality level s (n) dened by condition (9), with
1  n  n. We focus on the e¤ect of an increase in the number of rms on
consumer surplus and on social welfare.
Consumer Surplus: Under the assumption of quasi-linear consumer utility,
when there are n rms, the expected (Marshalian) consumer surplus is
CS (s; n) = R (s)
24 nZ
0
P (z) dz   P (n)n
35 : (14)
The marginal e¤ect of an increase in the number of rms on the expected consumer
surplus is
dCS
dn
=
@CS
@n
+
@CS
@s
ds
dn
: (15)
The direct e¤ect is given by
@CS
@n
= R (s) [ P 0 (n)n] > 0; (16)
i.e. consumer surplus increases through a decrease in the price of the product.
The indirect e¤ect, @CS
@s
ds
dn
, represents the e¤ect of an increase in the number of
rms through its impact on the equilibrium quality. We know from Proposition 1
that ds

dn
< 0. The e¤ect of an increase of the quality level on consumer surplus is
given by
@CS
@s
= R0 (s)
24 nZ
0
P (z) dz   P (n)n
35 > 0: (17)
Then, @CS
@s
ds
dn
< 0, i.e. the indirect e¤ect is negative. Finally, the global e¤ect of
an increase of the number of rms on consumer surplus is ambiguous because both
the price and the quality of the product decrease.
Social Welfare: Social welfare is denoted byW = W (s; n), withW (s; n) given
by:
W (s; n) = R (s)
nZ
0
P (z) dz   n [C (s) + F ] ; (18)
We now evaluate the welfare e¤ect of competition. Di¤erentiating condition
(18) with respect to n, we obtain
dW
dn
=
@W
@n
+
@W
@s
ds
dn
: (19)
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The welfare e¤ect is twofold. The direct e¤ect is given by
@W
@n
= R(s)P (n)  [C(s) + F ] : (20)
As long as prots remain non negative, @W
@n
has a positive value. This represents
the classical positive e¤ect of competition. The indirect e¤ect is given by @W
@s
ds
dn
.
According to Proposition 1, the quality level decreases with respect to the number
of rms, ds

dn
< 0.
The welfare e¤ect of an increase in the quality level is given by
@W
@s
= R0 (s)
nZ
0
P (z) dz   nC 0 (s) : (21)
Since P 0 < 0, we have
P (n) <
nZ
0
P (z) dz: (22)
According to the latter condition and (9) @W
@s has a positive value. Therefore,
the indirect welfare e¤ect, @W
@s
ds
dn
, has a negative value. The welfare e¤ect of
competition is ambiguous. An increase in the number of rms reduces each rms
market power and prices, thereby improving social welfare. Yet at the same time,
it lowers the average quality, reducing social welfare.
Proposition 2 Under the Laissez Faire situation, at the free entry point the
number of rms is larger than the optimal number of rms.3
Proposition 2 states that n > nW ,4 where nW represents the number of rms
that maximizes social welfare. Figure 1 illustrates this result.5
3Until now we have ignored the integer problem. Our results are qualitatively una¤ected if
we consider n as an integer (the mathematical writing is a bit di¤erent).
4Considering n has an integer, this inequality would be weak. Indeed, in the space of real
numbers, the welfare function may have an optimum reached between two integers and the free
entry point may also be between these two integers. In this case, the welfare optimal integer
level is the free entry integer number of rms.
5Figure 1 represents the following specication of the model. The industry reputation is
characterized by a logit function of the average quality, sa: R (sa) = sa1+sa . The inverse demand
function is assumed to be linear, P (n) =    n where  > 1. The cost function is C (si) =
1
2 (1 + si)
2.
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nn*nW
Total Profit
Welfare
CS
Figure1. The Welfare E¤ects of Competition
Figure 1 also illustrate the welfare e¤ect of competition. Welfare rst increases
and then decreases with the number of rms. When n rms compete in the market
under the Laissez Faire situation, the positive welfare e¤ect of competition is
lower than the negative e¤ect of free-riding on quality. Therefore, the regulator
needs to intervene in order to avoid free-riding incentives and to prevent the entire
industry from failing to perform. This result contributes to the critical debate
in the industrial organisation literature that concerns the justication of anti-
competitive regulation. For instance, Mankiw and Whinston (1986) have shown
that in homogeneous product markets, free entry can lead to a socially excessive
number of rms. They model a situation in which the output per rm falls as
the number of rms in the industry increases. In our model, we assume that the
output per rm is constant, however, the free-riding incentives lead us to the same
conclusion.
4 Minimum Quality Standard
In this section, while maintaining our focus on the entry issue, we examine the
situation where the regulator imposes a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS). We
assume that, before stage 1, a MQS s is announced. Firms decide to enter the
market at stage 1 and choose a quality level si  s at stage 2. Since the purpose of
this section is to compare the e¤ect of di¤erent levels of MQS, we do not consider
the regulator as a player, that is s is given.
Market structure and MQS: In this section, we derive the equilibrium of the
game for di¤erent levels of the MQS, s  0. The equilibrium quality and the
equilibrium number of rms will depend on the level of the MQS. Let us de-
note s = s (s; n) the equilibrium quality of stage 2 and n = n (s; F ) the
equilibrium number of rms. In the previous section, we have characterised the
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equilibrium of this game under the Laissez Faire situation, that is for s = 0.
In other words, s (0; n) and n (0; F ) are such that s (0; n) = s (n) and
n (0; F ) = n (F ), where s characterised by condition (9) and n characterised
by condition (10).
In order to present the next proposition, we need to dene a particular quality
level and a particular number of rms denoted by sc and nc, respectively. sc and nc
are dened as the equilibrium quality level and the equilibrium number of rms of
the following two stage game: at stage 1, rms enter the market if their expected
prot is non negative, and at stage 2 rms behave cooperatively, i.e. each rm
provides the same quality level in order to maximise the total prot of the industry,
n (R (s)P (n)  C (s)). sc and nc are characterised by R0 (sc)P (nc) = C 0 (sc) and
R (sc)P (nc)  C (sc)  F = 0.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium and,
(i) If s  s; then the MQS has no e¤ect on quality, i.e. s = s, neither on
competition , i.e. n = n,
(ii) If s < s, then the MQS is binding s = s. There exists s0  sc such that for
s  s  s0, n  n and for s0 < s, n < n. The maximal number of rms is
nc and is achieved for s = sc.
Relatively to the Laissez Fairesituation: If the MQS is not binding (s  s),
the MQS does not alter either competition or the rms quality level.
We discuss now the case when the MQS is binding: Increasing the level of the
MQS (s < s < sc) increases the level of the industry reputation by increasing
rmsquality levels. The MQS induces rms to enter the market as long as the
cost of providing the MQS level is su¢ ciently low. When the MQS equals to the
cooperative equilibrium quality level (s = sc), the industry reputation is maxi-
mal. When the MQS is imposed at such a level, a maximum number of rms (nc)
enters the market. For MQS levels which are higher than the cooperative equi-
librium quality level (s > sc), the marginal cost of providing quality overcomes
the marginal benet that leads to a drop in prots. However, the number of rms
remains higher than it would be under the Laissez Fairesituation as long as the
MQS is low enough (sc < s  s0). For the highest MQS levels (s0 > s), the number
of rms becomes lower than the number of rms in the Laissez Fairesituation
(n). This is the only situation in which the MQS can reduce competition. Figure
2 illustrates those results.
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s
n
s* sc s'
n*
Figure 2. Number of Firms and MQS
In the light of these statements, we turn now to analyse the welfare e¤ect after
the introduction of a given MQS.
Welfare e¤ect of the MQS: When a MQS s is imposed, the social welfare
function can be written as
W (s; n) = R(s)
24nZ
0
P (z)dz   nP (n)
35 : (23)
According to the result of Proposition 3, we can provide the following relationship
between the level of the MQS and social welfare:
Corollary 4 Relatively to the Laissez Faire situation, social welfare is (i) un-
a¤ected when the level of the MQS is su¢ ciently low (s  s), (ii) improved when
the level of the MQS is in a middle range (s < s  s0).
Relatively to the Laissez Fairesituation, the introduction of a MQS unam-
biguously improves welfare as long as the level of the MQS leads to a greater
number of active rms.
5 Conclusion
We have considered industries where rms provide di¤erent quality levels. They
cannot di¤erentiate themselves from their rivals but can su¤er from externalities
due to rivals low-quality levels. We have shown that a Laissez Faire situation
leads to a sub-optimal number of rms in the market. The regulator face di¤erent
solutions which all have their positive and negative e¤ects both on quality and
competition. In such a case, the regulator face a trade-o¤ between quality and
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competition. The regulator can choose to restrict the number of rms in the
market. On the one hand, such regulation would limit the incentive to free ride
and then provide a su¢ cient level of quality. On the other hand, this regulation
has also two negative e¤ects. First, it leads to an increase in the price. Second,
free riding incentives are reduced but they are not eradicated. The other solution
available is the introduction of a Minimum Quality Standard. We have shown that
a Minimum Quality Standard can eradicate incentives to free-ride and can sustain
both a high average level of quality and a high degree of competition.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Di¤erentiating condition (9) with respect to n we obtain
ds
dn
=

  1
n
P 0 (n) +
1
n2
P (n)

R0 (s)
1
n
R00 (s)P (n)  C 00 (s) ; (24)
Since P 0 < 0, we have 0 <
  1
n
P 0 (n) + 1
n2
P (n)

. Moreover, R0 (s) > 0, then,
sign

ds
dn

= sign

1
n
R00 (s)P (n)  C 00 (s)

< 0: (25)
Proof of Proposition 2
We evaluate the marginal variation of welfare at the free entry point. Di¤erenti-
ating condition (18) with respect to the number of rms n; we obtain
dW
dn
(s; n) =
24R0 (s) nZ
0
P (z) dz   nC 0 (s)
35 @s
@n
(26)
According to Proposition 1 and
@W
@s
= R0 (s)
nZ
0
P (z) dz   nC 0 (s) > 0; (27)
This expression has a strict negative value.
Proof of Proposition 3
When the MQS is not binding, i.e s  s, it is straightforward that s = s and
n = n.
When the MQS is such that s > s, it is straightforward that s = s. Consid-
ering the number of rms which enter the market at stage 1, n, is characterised
by
R (s)P (n)  C (s) = F; (28)
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Di¤erentiating this condition with respect to s leads to
@n
@s
=
R0 (s)P (n)  C 0 (s)
 R (s)P 0 (n) ; (29)
Then,
sign

@n
@s

= sign [R0 (s)P (n)  C 0 (s)] : (30)
R (s)P (n)   C (s) is the per rm prot when all the quality levels are s. Per
rm prot is increasing for s  sc and decreasing for sc  s. Hence, @n@s  0 when
s  sc and @n@s  0 when sc  s. Then, n achieves its maximum, nc for s = sc.
Moreover, according to Assumption 2, lim
s!+1
(R (s)P (1)  C (s)  F )  0, then
lim
s!+1
(n)  1. Therefore, there exists s0  sc such that for s  s  s0, n  n
and for s0 < s, n < n.
Proof of Corrolary 4
When the MQS is low, i.e. s  s, according to Proposition 3, social welfare
is W (s; n) = W (s; n). When the MQS is in a middle range, s < s  s0,
according to Proposition 3, social welfare is W (s; n) = W (s; n (s; F )) with
s > s and n > n. Since social welfare unambiguously increases with respect to
s and n, W (s; n) > W (s; n).
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